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Abstract
Investment decisions in renewable energy sources such as small hydro, wind
power, biomass and solar are frequently made in the context of enormous uncer-
tainty surrounding both intermittent generation and the highly volatile electricity
spot prices that are used for clearing of trades. This paper presents a new portfolio-
based approach for selecting long-term investments in small-scale renewable energy
projects and matching contracts for the sale of the resulting electricity. Using this
approach, we have formulated a stochastic optimisation model that maximises a
holding company’s risk-averse measure of value. Using an illustrative example
representative of investment decisions within the Brazilian electricity system, we
investigate the sensitivity of the optimised portfolio composition and commercial-
isation strategy to contract prices in the free contracting environment and to the
decision maker’s attitude towards risk. The numerical results demonstrate it is
possible to reduce significantly financial risks, such as the price-quantity risk, not
only by exploiting the complementarity of the considered renewable sources gener-
ation profiles, but also by selecting the optimal mix of commercialisation contracts
from different markets. We find that the multi-market strategy generally results in
appreciably higher optimal value than single-market strategies and can be applied
to a wide range of renewable generators and contracts.
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1. Introduction
Although the Latin America and Caribbean region is the region with by far the
highest share of electricity generated from renewable sources worldwide [1], most of
the technical potential in that region remains unexploited [2]. In 2012, around 66%
of the region’s electricity output was generated by renewable energy sources, with
hydropower accounting for almost 93% of the renewables’ share and for some 61%
of total electricity generation [3]. While the region’s hydropower sector, currently
dominated by large-scale hydroelectric power plants, is already relatively mature
[4], there is a vast potential for non-traditional and small-scale renewable energy
sources such as wind (onshore and offshore), solar (PV and thermal), geothermal,
bioenergy, and ocean [5]. A recent study [5] found that it would be sufficient to
exploit only 1.6% of the region’s technical potential for renewable energy use in
order to meet its current demand for electricity, with 4% being sufficient to meet
the estimated demand growth by 2050.
According to Brazil’s National Energy Plan 2030 [6], the country’s energy sys-
tem, currently the largest in South-America, has enormous potential for expansion
through further investment in renewable energy sources like small hydro (SH), wind
power (WP), biomass (BIO), and solar. The government’s most recent energy ex-
pansion plan [7] estimates that a total investment of R$ 116.3 billions into these
sources is required between 2014 and 2023 to achieve the predicted addition of
30 GW of renewable capacity. Brazil’s National Electricity Regulatory Agency
ANEEL [8] defines SH to be a hydroelectric power plant with an installed capacity
between 1 MW and 30 MW. Usually several WP plants, or wind turbines, are
grouped into a wind farm in order to scale-up electricity generation. BIO includes
sugar cane bagasse, black liquor, eucalyptus trees [9], firewood, rice husk, and
biogas. However these renewable energy sources, particularly SH and WP [10],
are strongly characterised by their stochastic and seasonal generation profiles and
these major sources of uncertainty adversely affect energy commercialisation.
Since its second stage of reform in 2004, Brazil’s electricity sector offers two
different environments for electricity procurement: the Regulated Contracting En-
vironment (RCE), in which distributors acquire energy in a procedure regulated
by the government [11], and the Free Contracting Environment (FCE), in which
sellers and buyers freely and bilaterally negotiate contract terms [12]. Either en-
vironment can be used by Generation companies (Gencos) to sell energy and by
traders to buy or sell energy. A short-term electricity spot market is used for the
clearing of trades in both environments. However, spot prices in Brazil are highly
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volatile and thus do not provide reliable economic incentives for new investments
[11].
These uncertainties create a number of related challenges for Brazil’s renew-
able Gencos. For instance, given the fact that forward contracts must be cleared
in the spot market, Gencos are exposed to “price-quantity risk” [11]. This occurs
whenever the seller is “long” in contracts, i.e. cannot generate what the contract
requires it to sell, thus requiring the missing energy to be bought on the volatile
spot market at potentially high prices [13]. Contract prices in the RCE are gener-
ally lower than in the FCE. Reasons for this are that contracts in the RCE are sold
through competitive auctions rather than the bilateral freely-negotiated contracts
used in the FCE, and also RCE contracts usually contain clauses that reduce the
risk to the Genco, which is uncommon in the FCE.
A number of studies have been presented in recent years that address strate-
gic decision-making in the uncertain conditions of renewable energy investments
and commercialisation in Brazil. With regard to energy commercialisation in the
RCE, [14] presented a stochastic optimisation model providing hydroelectric Gen-
cos with bidding strategies in multi-item iterative auctions of long-term contracts.
This model takes into account the Gencos’ portfolios of existing contracts in order
to “learn” from experiences in past auctions. This enables the model to generate
bidding strategies for Gencos to hedge against risk. The application of such portfo-
lio approaches to risk reduction is well documented in the literature on renewable
energy investments (see [15] and [16] for overviews of methodologies and evalu-
ation methods, respectively). Recent examples of applying portfolio approaches
in the context of renewable energy sources on a country level include China [17],
Denmark [18], Italy [19], and Japan [20].
A range of models have been presented with regard to energy commercialisation
in the FCE. Recently, [21] proposed a stochastic optimisation model to identify
the optimal energy commercialisation strategies for a Genco that owns a portfolio
of already existing SH plants and can sell energy via contracts of 6-24 months’ du-
ration. Smaller portfolio sizes are represented in a stochastic optimisation model
in [22], in which the authors investigated the selection of a portfolio of trading
strategies for SH and BIO (cogeneration from sugar cane bagasse) generation,
thus combining two energy sources that have complementary (seasonal) availabil-
ity. In contrast to [22], [13] analyses an energy generation portfolio composed
of SH and WP. The authors present a new commercial model for a WP Genco
based on a joint-selling strategy with an SH Genco, that exploits the well-known
complementarity between the portfolio’s two renewable energy sources in order to
hedge against price-quantity risk. Generation portfolios of three energy sources
are represented in [23], in which the authors use a cooperative game approach to
examine the competitiveness of SH, WP, and BIO competing for contracts within
3
the FCE.
The main contributions of our current paper are in the following four areas:
1) None of the previous studies have considered commercialisation strategies
that use contracts from both Brazilian contract markets (FCE and RCE),
and most of them consider only one or two of the available renewable energy
sources (SH, WP, and BIO). The properties of the contracts in the two
markets are different and the generation profiles of the renewable sources
are different, so these restrictions limit the scope for controlling risk. In
contrast, the current paper introduces a portfolio-based multi-market, multi-
asset approach encompassing both contract markets and all three renewable
energy sources.
2) None of the previous studies have investigated how the investors attitude to
risk affects the optimal choice of portfolio composition and commercialisa-
tion strategy, but this is done in the current paper using the risk aversion
parameters within a Conditional Value-at-Risk (CVaR) framework as the
model of the decision maker’s attitude towards risk.
3) We show in detail how to model currently used contract types in each market
and how to incorporate these in a stochastic-optimisation-based tool for se-
lecting the optimal portfolio of investments and commercialisation contracts
for risk-averse investors.
4) We describe a test case based on realistic contract structures and real re-
newable data from the Brazilian system, and use this to demonstrate the ad-
vantage of the multi-market, multi-asset approach over the restricted choices
of strategies considered in previous studies. We show how the two contract
markets and three renewable sources can be combined to mitigate financial
risks such as the price-quantity risk, whilst considerably increasing optimal
values, and also give insights into why it is that our multi-market, multi-
asset approach performs better at controlling risk. In addition, we explain
how relative contract prices in the markets and the decision maker’s attitude
towards risk affect the optimal results.
It is important to note that multi-market selling strategies and contracts of these
types are currently being used in the Brazilian power system and have already
had an important role in driving the sharp expansion of renewables in Brazil, but
this work provides the hard evidence of the benefits of the proposed multi-market
strategy and the reasons for this.
Section 2 describes the approach that a holding company can apply to optimise
its choice of renewable energy investments and financial contracts in both the
RCE and FCE markets while controlling risk. A model is presented in Section 3
that maximises a holding company’s risk-adjusted measure of value (Subsection
2.5) and gives the corresponding optimal size of SH, WP, and BIO renewable
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energy projects as well as the optimal size of forward and call option contracts
in the RCE and FCE. This portfolio optimisation model is then applied to an
illustrative example representative of investment decisions within the Brazilian
electricity system (Section 4). Results are presented and discussed in Section 5.
Finally, some concluding remarks are provided in Section 6.
2. The investment and commercialisation problem
In this section, we present the approach taken in this paper to the portfolio-
based multi-market, multi-asset investment problem.
2.1. Commercialisation of electricity in Brazil
In the reformed Brazilian electricity sector the total amount of energy sold by
a Genco in any month through contracts in the RCE and FCE must not exceed
its so-called “Firm Energy Certificates”, or certificates in shorthand [24]. These
certificates are issued by the Ministry of Mines and Energy and represent the
long-term average amount of power that can be relied upon from the plant (in
avgMW) [25]. The RCE has contracts of two different types, which are sold in
regulated public auctions. These are standard long-term forward contracts (i.e.
Power Purchase Agreements, also known in Brazil as “quantity contracts” [26]),
and call options, also known in Brazil as “availability contracts” [11]. In the case
of forward contracts, the seller of the contract (e.g. a Genco), is contractually
required to deliver a stipulated amount of energy for a fixed price to the buyer
(e.g. a distribution company). In the event of delivering less than the stipulated
amount, the seller must bear the costs for purchasing the missing quantity in the
spot market. In the case of call options, the buyer “rents” the power plant, paying
a monthly fixed price to the seller and takes all the generation the plant produces.
In the FCE, the purchasing and selling of electricity occurs through freely and
bilaterally negotiated contracts [22]. Long-term contracts with structures similar
to the RCE, may be used for contracting in the FCE. However, buyers and sellers
must comply with the rules given in [27] for the commercialisation of energy in the
FCE. One such rule is that, independent of the contract, trades must be cleared
in the spot market either by the buyer or seller.
The prices used for clearing trades in Brazil are known as PLDs and referred
to as “spot prices”, however they are not determined by equilibrium prices in a
normal market. Instead they are calculated as short-run marginal costs in a cost-
based central dispatch model NEWAVE [28], and published weekly ahead of time
by the country’s electricity clearing house CCEE. For a comprehensive description
of the NEWAVE model see [29]. The Brazilian system is subdivided into four
interconnected submarkets (north, south, northeast, and southeast) and each has
its own spot price [13].
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2.2. Commercialisation strategy of a generation company
It is assumed here that every considered renewable energy investment project
is carried out by a single Genco. A Genco can divide the energy it sells between
the RCE, the FCE, and the spot market. Figure 1 gives an example of a commer-
cialisation strategy for a Genco which could be obtained through a “new energy”
auction. This is a “A-5”-type [30], which means that the Genco is contractually
FCE Construction 
FCE 
RCE 
I 
2 years 20 years 
F
 
SPOT SPOT 
3 years 
II III IV 
1 year 
P 
Figure 1: Multi-market strategy of a Genco.
required to start delivering the stipulated amount of energy five years after the
auction has taken place, which provides some flexibility for the Genco’s commer-
cialisation strategy.
After the power plant’s construction during the first three years of the project,
the Genco can start to sell electricity and so begin to generate revenues at the start
of the fourth-year, which is two-years ahead of the requirement of the RCE’s long-
term contract. During this two-year period, as in [21], the generated electricity
can be sold both via 2-year contracts in the FCE and via the spot market. In fact,
the fraction of the generated electricity sold via the FCE can be interpreted as a
strategic trade, whereas the uncontracted amount, which is necessarily sold in the
spot market, serves as a hedge.
At the beginning of the sixth year of the project, the Genco may sell some of its
energy via a 20-year contract within the RCE that was signed 5 years earlier. At
the same time, however, the Genco may also start to sell a share of its generated
electricity via 20-year forward contracts in the FCE, e.g. using a Power Purchase
Agreement. In addition to these two 20-year contract options, an uncontracted
amount of energy may be sold in the spot market as well. Although previous
studies have considered the possibility to sell energy via both long-term contracts
in the FCE and the spot market, none of these studies considered such a multi-
market strategy encompassing the FCE, the RCE, and the spot market.
Finally, there is a one-year period (year 26) immediately following the end of
commercialisation in which all residual financial requirements of payments from
contractual obligations in the RCE are settled.
The total amount sold via contracts by a particular generator (with installed
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capacity P) must never exceed F, which is the certificate specified for that gener-
ator.
2.3. The holding company
The holding is the primary actor that invests in new renewable energy projects
and commercialises the generated electricity in the FCE, the RCE, and the spot
market. Figure 2 shows the structure of a holding consisting of m Gencos rep-
resenting new renewable energy investment projects and a Portfolio Manager. A
Genco 1 
(e.g. SH) 
Genco 2 
(e.g. WP) 
Genco 3 
(e.g. BIO) 
Genco m 
(SH/WP/ 
BIO) 
Free Consumer 1 Free Consumer 2 Free Consumer n . . . 
PORTFOLIO
MANAGER 
SH Gen. 
t 
WP Gen. 
t 
BIO Gen. 
t 
FCE 
Contract 1 Contract 2 Contract 3 Contract m . . . 
RCE 
$ 
$ $ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
Optimal  
Portfolio 
t 
HOLDING 
ENERGY 
ENERGY ENERGY 
ENERGY 
ENERGY 
ENERGY 
ENERGY 
ENERGY 
ENERGY 
ENERGY ENERGY 
Figure 2: Structure of holding and its possibilities for commercialising energy via both the RCE
and the FCE. Note: Incoming cash flows representing revenues from the sale of electricity are
indicated by lines and dollar symbols. Outgoing cash flows representing investment and operation
and maintenance costs as well as potential contractual penalties are not shown.
single Genco may be a SH, WP, or BIO Genco. The holding company has certain
tax advantages compared to the sum of the parts operated separately, but in this
paper the interest is in how it can be used to mitigate the risk of the combined
portfolio of Gencos and contracts.
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The holding company has contracts in the RCE and FCE. For simplicity in this
study there is only one contract in the RCE per Genco resulting in m different
contracts. The holding’s Portfolio Manager signs n forward contracts with free
consumers within the FCE. Any imbalance between the total amount contracted
and generated has to be bought or sold in the appropriate spot market. In order
to simplify this approach, it is assumed that all projects being considered start at
the same time and have the time structure of Figure 1.
2.4. Characterisation of uncertainties
The uncertainties considered in this study are the renewables’ energy generation
profiles (in MWh per month) and electricity spot prices (in R$/MWh per month).
These random variables are represented by a set of discrete scenarios with their
corresponding probabilities. A single scenario consists of a time series for the
number of months of generation in the plan (e.g. 264 months for the strategy
in Figure 1), specifying for each month what the electricity spot prices are in
each of Brazil’s four submarkets and the predicted generation of the SH and WP
generators that may be built. The model can be modified simply for any other
desired base period.
The statistical model and the procedure for generating scenarios are the same
as in [13] and [31], with the former presenting additionally a flow chart of the
simulation procedure. The steps followed were:
1. Estimate parameters for lag 12 Vector AutoRegression with eXogenous vari-
ables (VARX) model (to capture variation within the 12 months of a year)
fitting actual historic SH and WP generation as well as historic NEWAVE
reservoir inflows.
2. Using the NEWAVE dispatch system first generate reservoir inflow scenarios,
then for each of these calculate the corresponding spot prices in each of the
four submarkets.
3. For each inflow scenario use the VARX model from Step 1 to generate a
corresponding SH and WP generation sample.
4. Combine each spot price scenario from Step 2 with its corresponding gen-
eration sample from Step 3 to get a matching spot price and generation
scenario.
2.5. Measure of value
The risk measure, ρ
( · ), used in this study to quantify the investor’s attitude
towards risk is a convex combination of the (risk neutral) expectation operator
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and the CVaR, that is:
ρ
( · ) = λ · CVaRα( · )+ (1− λ) · E[ · ], (2.1)
where λ ∈ [0, 1] is the weighting of the single components, and CVaRα is defined
to be the expected value of the (1 − α)% worst cases. The parameters λ and α
serve as risk aversion parameters chosen by the investor and effect the form of the
risk measure: the closer λ is to 0, the less risk-averse the investor is, with λ = 0
corresponding to a risk neutral investor, and as α increases the risk measure gives
weight to the more extreme bad cases [32]. CVaR, which is also called expected
shortfall, and its useful properties were introduced in [33]. Its advantages are: it
is a coherent risk measure that satisfies four desirable properties [34]; it has an
intuitive economic interpretation allowing it to be used as a measure of value [32];
and it is convex and can be formulated as a linear programme allowing CVaR to
be implemented in convex optimisation problems [33].
Unlike the approach taken in [13], which measures risk on a monthly time scale,
in this paper we assume that the holding company is concerned with controlling
risk over each entire year. Let the (positive or negative) net cash flow in month
t ∈ T of scenario s ∈ S be denoted by Vt,s, where T is the set of months, S the
scenario set, and ps the probability of scenario s, and let the total net cash flow in
year a ∈ T A discounted to the beginning of that year be denoted by V Aa,s, where
T A is the set of years. Then, for all a ∈ T A, s ∈ S:
V Aa,s =
∑
t∈mA(a)
Vt,s
(1 +K)t−12·(a−1)
, (2.2)
where mA(a) denotes the set of months in year a and K represents the discount
rate per month t. Applying the risk measure ρ
( · ) to these annual values for all
s ∈ S gives:
V Aa = λ · CVaRα
({
V Aa,s, ps
}
s∈S
)
+ (1− λ) · E
[ {
V Aa,s, ps
}
s∈S
]
, (2.3)
which can be interpreted as the measure of value for year a. The terms defining
the annual measure of value in (2.3) are all linear in the variable except for the
CVaRα term. As shown in [33], the value of CVaRα
({
V Aa,s, ps
}
s∈S
)
is the optimal
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objective value of the following problem:
max
z,δ
za − 1
1− α ·
∑
s∈S
ps · δa,s (2.4)
s.t. δa,s ≥ za −
∑
t∈mA(a)
Vt,s
(1 +K)t−12·(a−1)
, s ∈ S (2.5)
δa,s ≥ 0, s ∈ S. (2.6)
The expected value for year a is given by:
E
[ {
V Aa,s, ps
}
s∈S
]
=
∑
s∈S
∑
t∈mA(a)
Vt,s
(1 +K)t−12·(a−1)
· ps. (2.7)
The measure of value for the entire investment, V , can then be obtained by taking
the net present value (NPV) of these annual values giving:
V =
∑
a∈T A
V Aa
(1 +KA)a−1
, (2.8)
where KA is the discount rate per year a.
3. Mathematical model
This section contains the mathematical formulation of the previously presented
approach as a stochastic portfolio optimisation problem. The notation used is
listed in the Nomenclature section at the end.
3.1. Assumptions
The general assumptions made to allow a simplified implementation of the
approach are as follows:
• The payment of taxes (e.g. see [35]) and the Brazilian transmission (TUST)
and distribution (TUSD) fees are not included within the model.
• No plant’s installed capacity can exceed 30 MW, which allows it to be clas-
sified as an incentivised renewable energy source.
• Contracts in the FCE are standard forward contracts that must be cleared
in the spot market by the holding’s Portfolio Manager.
• The amount contracted to be delivered by each contract in either the RCE
or the FCE is the same for all months covered by the contract.
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• It is assumed that all decision variables take continuous values. In order
to overcome the issue that the size of a power plant may not be chosen
arbitrarily in reality (e.g. economies of scale), specifically in cases where the
optimal plant size would be less than the “standardly available” or “off-the-
shelf” size, it is assumed that the holding company can buy any proportion
of the plant, with the remainder being purchased by other companies, the
costs and outputs being shared proportionally.
3.2. Cash flow model
The holding’s cash flows (in R$) occurring during the investment horizon given
by T can be subdivided into two main components: a deterministic component
that solely represents a cost cash flow and a stochastic component modelling com-
mercialisation.
The deterministic component is represented by the cash flow Ct defined in
(Appendix B) and characterises costs due to capital expenditures in terms of
investments costs for the power plant and costs for operation and maintenance in
month t.
The second component is stochastic and models the cash flows related to the
commercialisation of energy in the FCE, the RCE, and the spot market. These
different strategies are subdivided into three parts. Note that since there can be
no generation until the plant is built, Rt,s must be zero ∀t ∈ T I , s ∈ S.
In the first part, standard forward contracts i for commercialisation in the
FCE are modelled by using a similar structure to the one presented by [14]. For
all t ∈ T II , s ∈ S:
Rt,s =
∑
i∈CFCE
[(
pFCE,IIi − piCi,t,s
)
·QFCE,IIi · ht
]
+
∑
j∈P
[
piPj,t,s · gj,t,s · Fj · ht
]
(3.1)
In other words, the holding’s Portfolio Manager receives the contract price pFCE,IIi
for the contracted amount QFCE,IIi ·ht, and, at the same time, buys the contracted
amount QFCE,IIi · ht in the spot market where contract i is concluded (and hence
where the associated free consumer is located) and sells the amount gj,t,s · Fj · ht
generated by plant j in month t and scenario s in the spot market where plant j
is located.
The second part describes the stochastic cash flow when the contracting of
energy is possible via both the FCE and the RCE. It thus extends the stochastic
cash flow’s mathematical formulation in (3.1) by adding a stochastic function RRCEj,t,s
that represents the stochastic cash flow of a contract in the RCE of plant j in month
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t and scenario s. For all t ∈ T III , s ∈ S:
Rt,s =
∑
i∈CFCE
[(
pFCE,IIIi −piCi,t,s
)
·QFCE,IIIi ·ht
]
+
∑
j∈P
[
RRCEj,t,s +pi
P
j,t,s·gj,t,s·
(
Fj−FRCEj
)
·ht
]
(3.2)
The form of the stochastic function RRCEj,t,s (which depends on F
RCE
j ) is complex and
so is omitted (see Appendix C for examples). This novel multi-market approach
intuitively follows from the structure of commercialisation shown by Figure 2. The
novelty of this model is it enables commercialisation of energy through a multi-
market selling strategy.
The third part exclusively represents the potential charges due to the con-
tractual obligations (being contractually required to pay for a potential “under-
performance”) of call options in the RCE:
Rt,s =
∑
j∈PWP
RRCEj,t,s , ∀t ∈ T IV , s ∈ S (3.3)
The net cash flow in month t of scenario s is Vt,s = −Ct +Rt,s, where Ct is the
cash flow representing cost, which is independent of scenario, and Rt,s is the cash
flow representing revenue, which is scenario dependent.
3.3. Contracting constraints
As mentioned in Subsection 2.2, the certificate available for a plant represents
an upper bound for the amount that might be contracted. The constraints corre-
sponding to the forward contracts modelled in (3.1), (3.2), and (C.1) are given by
(3.4), (3.5), and (3.6), respectively.
0 ≤
∑
i∈CFCE
QFCE,IIi ≤
∑
j∈P
Fj (3.4)
0 ≤
∑
i∈CFCE
QFCE,IIIi ≤
∑
j∈P
(
Fj − FRCEj
)
(3.5)
0 ≤ QRCEj ≤ FRCEj , ∀j ∈ PSH (3.6)
However, there is also an upper bound Fmaxj for Fj of every plant j. If Fj equals
zero for any plant j, this simply means that the plant is not constructed.
0 ≤ FRCEj ≤ Fj ≤ Fmaxj , ∀j ∈ P (3.7)
Moreover, every contract i in the FCE during major section S must satisfy the
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obvious constraints ensuring non-negativity of contracted amounts:
QFCE,Si ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ CFCE (3.8)
3.4. Optimisation model
The overall formulation for optimising the holding’s portfolio (i.e. maximising
the objective function (2.8) subject to a number of constraints) is given below.
Objective
max
∑
a∈T A
λ · (za − 11−α ·∑s∈S ps · δa,s)+ (1− λ) ·∑s∈S∑t∈mA(a) −Ct+Rt,s(1+K)t−12·(a−1) · ps
(1 +KA)a−1
(3.9)
Constraints
δa,s ≥ za −
∑
t∈mA(a)
−Ct +Rt,s
(1 +K)t−12·(a−1)
, ∀a ∈ T A, s ∈ S (3.10)
δa,s ≥ 0, ∀a ∈ T A, s ∈ S (3.11)
(3.4)− (3.8)
Note that Ct and Rt,s are linear functions of the variables and can be eliminated
from above objective and constraints using equations (B.2), (3.1)-(3.3) and (C.1)-
(C.3).
4. Numerical example
This section describes the computational implementation of the optimisation
model and subsequently assigns numerical values to deterministic and stochastic
input variables representative of the Brazilian local conditions.
4.1. Model implementation
The stochastic optimisation model was implemented in Xpress.
4.2. Deterministic input values
In this numerical example, the structure of the Genco is as shown in Figure
1 and corresponds to the time periods given in Appendix A. Moreover, it will
consider three renewable energy investment projects, one in each of the available
technologies. Each of these has the possibility to sell some energy via the RCE. The
holding’s Portfolio Manager may decide to commercialise energy via four contracts
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in the FCE, one in each of the four existing submarkets, which are southeast (SE),
south (S), northeast (NE), and north (N). The consideration of only four contracts,
one in each submarket, is done to simplify this numerical example. A summary of
sets and their corresponding elements is given by Tables 1 and A.4.
Set Element(s) of set
P {SH,WP,BIO}
PSH {SH}
PWP {WP}
PBIO {BIO}
CFCE {SE,S,NE,N}
Table 1: Summary of chosen elements for the sets.
None of the available renewable technologies considered is available throughout
the year, so the long-term average annual generation (Fj in avgMW) of plant j
with 30 MW installed capacity is significantly below 30 MW. The investment costs
of plants were obtained by scaling their avgMW capacity Fj to the corresponding
installed capacity and multiplying that by the plants’ unit investment costs, which
are R$ 4.0 millions, 3.5 millions, and 3.0 millions per MWinstalled for SH, WP, and
BIO, respectively. Also, instead of assuming a constant 730 h in every month, we
use the actual number of hours in each month, starting with January 2012.
Sugar cane bagasse, the fuel for BIO generation in Brazil, is available only
during the months from May to November, and it allows these plants to operate at
their full capacity of 30 MW during this period. The average annual generation can
thus be determined as 30 MW·7/12 = 17.5 avgMW. Hence, given this deterministic
generation profile of BIO, gj,t,s amounts to 30/17.5 = 1.71 for the months May to
November of each year, and 0 otherwise.
Results of recent auctions for new energy (“A-5”) have indicated that prices
in the RCE are likely to be around R$ 130/MWh. We assume that prices in the
FCE for the initial 2-year period and the following 20-year period are equal with
pFCE,IIi = p
FCE,III
i for every contract i ∈ CFCE. This is a simplification: since prices
in the FCE are a consequence of bilateral negotiations different contracts can have
different prices and the prices can vary over time.
Table 2 shows a summary of the chosen values for the deterministic parameters
used within the optimisation model.
4.3. Generated scenarios
The generation of scenarios for SH and WP and the electricity spot prices
for Brazil’s four submarkets was completed using the statistical model and proce-
dure for scenario generation described in Subsection 2.4. Further input data was
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Parameter Index Value Unit
Fmaxj
j ∈ PSH 17.22 avgMW
j ∈ PWP 14.89 avgMW
j ∈ PBIO 17.5 avgMW
I0j
j ∈ PSH 6,968,609 R$/avgMW
j ∈ PWP 7,050,425 R$/avgMW
j ∈ PBIO 5,142,857 R$/avgMW
cFj j ∈ P 0 R$/avgMW
eRj j ∈ P 30% –
LTj j ∈ P 14 –
ij j ∈ P 7% –
{ht}t=37,38,...,299,300 {744, 696, . . . , 720, 744} h
KA 10% –
K 0.7974% –
λ 0.9 –
α 0.95 –
Table 2: Chosen values for the deterministic parameters.
provided by a Brazilian electricity company that is licensed to run the country’s
dispatch model NEWAVE. Historical data for the period from January 1981 to
December 2011 was used to estimate the parameters of the VARX model. More
precisely, in order to ensure comparability with previous studies [13] (considered
SH,WP) [22] (SH,BIO) [23] (SH,WP,BIO), historical data of the inflows from the
“Paraibuna” river, located in the southeast of Brazil, and of the generation of the
“Icaraizinho” wind farm, located in Brazil’s northeast, were used. We consider
SHs to be run-of-river, with output that is not controllable. This historical data
allowed the determination of the maximum certificate of both SH and WP as given
in Table 2.
Using this statistical model, we subsequently generated 2,000 equally likely
scenarios for renewable energy generation with |T II∪T III | = 264 and ps = 1/2000.
Given that the dispatch model’s time horizon is limited to a maximum of 10 years,
or 120 months, yet required scenarios for a 22-year period, the same data was used
for the second 10-year period and the first two years of the 10-year scenarios for
the 21st and 22nd year of energy production. Figure 3 shows relative generation
level g for 50 scenarios for a SH plant in Brazil’s southeast area during the first
twelve months of commercialisation as well as the average generation over all 2,000
scenarios for this same period. Figure 4 shows corresponding relative generation
levels for a WP plant in Brazil’s northeast area.
The generated scenarios for the electricity spot prices of Brazil’s four submar-
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Figure 3: Selection of 50 equally likely generation scenarios for the first twelve months of commer-
cialisation of an SH plant in the southeastern area of Brazil (in % of the maximum certificate).
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Figure 4: Selection of 50 equally likely generation scenarios for the first twelve months of com-
mercialisation of a WP plant in the northeastern area of Brazil (in % of the maximum certificate).
kets need to be processed before they can be applied in our optimisation model.
Brazil’s electricity clearing house CCEE publishes [27] minimum and maximum
values for spot prices in Brazil. For the year 2013 these bounds were R$ 14.13
and 780.03 per MWh. Prior to their inclusion in the model, scenarios produced by
the dispatch model over the 10-year period were “filtered” to round values outside
these bounds to the bounds. The spot prices in Brazil are highly volatile and have
no recognisable pattern, so are not plotted here. See [13] for an example.
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5. Results and discussion
It was claimed in the Introduction that a risk-averse holding company investing
in new renewable energy investment projects can mitigate financial risks not only
through making use of the complementarity of the considered renewable sources’
generation profiles, but also through a multi-market commercialisation strategy.
This section begins with an analysis of the way in which the holding’s optimised
portfolio composition and commercialisation strategy depend on the price of energy
contracts in the FCE. The RCE contract price is fixed at R$ 130/MWh, and all
the contracts in the FCE have the same price in the range from R$ 70 to 170 per
MWh. For a fixed risk aversion parameter λ of 0.9, Figures 5 and 6 show plots of
the optimised portfolio compositions and optimal commercialisation strategies as
a function of this FCE contract price.
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Figure 5: Optimal investment strategies over a range of FCE contract prices.
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Figure 6: Optimal commercialisation strategies over a range of FCE contract prices.
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It can be seen from Figure 5 that the amount of BIO installed is independent
of the FCE price. This is because the investment costs of BIO are comparatively
low and the contract conditions in the RCE are favourable (it receives revenues
even in months where its actual generation is zero), so the full amount available is
always installed. The maximum possible amount of WP is installed for FCE prices
of R$ 130/MWh and above and the maximum amount of SH for FCE prices of R$
140/MWh and above. In fact, SH and WP coexist in the portfolio for FCE prices
of R$ 120/MWh and above. The reason for their coexistence is that they have
complementary generation profiles; this allows them to jointly generate an almost
constant generation profile, thus leaving them less exposed to price-quantity risk.
However, the plants’ shares of both the RCE and FCE are affected quite dif-
ferently as we vary the energy price of contracts in the FCE. This is mainly due to
the difference in the contract rules for SH and WP in the RCE and FCE environ-
ments. Forward contracts for SH are similar in both environments, so the SH plant
will sell its energy mostly via the contract that offers the higher price, and will
therefore sell a bigger share in the FCE as the FCE contract price rises. However
in the case of WP, the reason for the share of the RCE reducing as the FCE price
rises is mainly because of contractual penalties resulting from call options in the
RCE, but is also because no energy can be sold in the spot market, which removes
opportunities of hedging there.
It can be seen from Figure 6 that as the FCE price rises, the FCE share of
the holding’s certificates sold increases and eventually eliminates the RCE share.
Interestingly, for the higher contract prices in the FCE, there remains an uncon-
tracted amount of energy that is sold in the spot market, and this is used as a
hedge. Figure 6 also shows the NPV of CVaRα and the NPV of the expected
profit, which together form the parts of the convex combination used within the
linear programme’s objective function.
In addition to the economic advantages to the holding from the complementary
availability of the different renewable energy sources, the use of contracts from both
markets has added significant extra value. Table 3 shows the optimal value of the
objective function (3.9) for different strategies for selling energy and different values
for the risk aversion parameter λ. In all cases contract prices in the RCE and FCE
were fixed to R$ 130 and 120 per MWh, respectively. Interestingly, having the
opportunity to sell some energy via the FCE in the two years prior to the start of
the RCE’s long-term contract (as in RCE b) already results in an optimal measure
of value on average some 36% higher than in RCE a , where all the energy generated
during this two-year period has to be sold in the spot market alone. Comparing the
optimal values of the single-market strategies, RCE b and FCE, justifies previously
noted tendencies: risk-seeking behaviour (λ = 0.1) results in the FCE strategy
providing higher objective values, while more risk-averse behaviour (λ = 0.9) puts
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Table 3: Optimal values (in R$ millions) of the objective function and its single components – order
CVaRα(·),E[·], ρ(·) – over a range of risk aversion parameters λ and given different commercialisation
strategies.
Strategy λ = 0.1 λ = 0.5 λ = 0.9
RCEa -1.43 62.59 56.19 32.67 49.40 41.04 32.67 49.40 34.35
RCEb -38.47 88.96 76.22 36.63 75.39 56.01 45.52 55.51 46.52
FCE † -0.14 88.31 79.46 19.36 80.47 49.91 21.76 75.98 27.18
RCE&FCE ‡ 3.97 91.03 82.32 43.58 75.68 59.63 45.39 72.31 48.09
a Commercialisation via spot market in year 4 and 5, then spot and RCE for years 6 to 25.
b Commercialisation via spot market and FCE in year 4 and 5, then spot and RCE for years 6 to
25.
† Commercialisation via spot market and FCE in year 4 and 5, then spot and FCE for years 6 to
25.
‡ Commercialisation via spot market and FCE in year 4 and 5, then spot, FCE and RCE for years
6 to 25.
the RCE b strategy in front.
Applying the multi-market strategy and thus allowing the holding and its single
Gencos to sell energy via both the RCE and the FCE results in significantly higher
optimal values for all three λ-values under consideration. When compared with
the best performing single-market strategy, optimal values achieved by the multi-
market strategy RCE&FCE are 3.60%, 6.46%, and 3.37% higher for the three risk
aversion parameters 0.1, 0.5, and 0.9, respectively. On the other hand, when com-
pared with the worst-performing single-market strategy, the multi-market strategy
achieved even higher increases of 46.51%, 45.31%, and 76.94%, respectively. Since
multi-market strategies include single-market strategies as special cases, it follows
that an optimal multi-market strategy will always be at least as good as any single-
market strategy. However, the above results show how significant a gain can be
obtained by using the multi-market approach introduced in this paper compared
to the single-market approaches of previous studies.
The dependence of the optimal portfolio composition on the actual value of
the risk aversion parameter λ, is particularly important for an investor in under-
standing the consequences of different risk attitudes. To illustrate this dependency
Figures 7 and 8 show for fixed contract prices in the RCE and FCE of R$ 130 and
120 per MWh, the way in which the holding’s optimal investment and commer-
cialisation strategies depend on the risk aversion parameter λ. Increasing λ from
0.001 to 0.999, (i.e. moving from a risk-neutral attitude to a risk-averse one) gener-
ally results in a smaller portfolio and in a selling strategy that uses comparatively
less contracts, but more spot market. At the same time, when interpreting the
difference between the NPV of the expectation and the NPV of CVaRα as some
kind of volatility (i.e. risk), the optimal portfolio becomes less risky and uncertain
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Figure 8: Optimal commercialisation strategies over a range of risk aversion parameters λ.
when λ is increased. Beginning at a λ of 0.2 (0.3), WP’s RCE (BIO’s FCE) share
is squeezed out of the portfolio and almost fully replaced by contracts in the FCE
(RCE). As argued above, the reason for this is mainly due to the contracts, which
are modelled differently in the FCE and RCE. For instance, BIO hugely benefits
from the design of its call option in the RCE, which enables it to generate rev-
enues even in months where its actual generation is zero. With a very high value
of λ equalling 0.999, further risk reduction can only be achieved by significantly
reducing the size of both the SH and WP plant. This somewhat surprising result
is due to the fact that the there is a finite portfolio of energy sources in the model,
so it is not possible to replace one energy source with more of another one.
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6. Conclusion
This paper presents a new portfolio-based approach for selecting long-term
investments in small-scale renewable energy projects and matching contracts for
the sale of the resulting electricity. The approach is illustrated by applying it to
an illustrative example representative of investment decision within the Brazilian
energy market. Unlike previously published studies, which have either only con-
sidered two of the three available renewable energy sources (SH, WP, and BIO), or
only one of the two available Brazilian contract markets (FCE and RCE) for com-
mercialisation of energy, this study has developed a portfolio-based multi-market,
multi-asset investment approach encompassing both markets and all available re-
newable energy sources.
This research has shown that under the current regulatory framework for en-
ergy commercialisation in Brazil, a holding company investing in new renewable
energy investment projects can mitigate financial risks such as the price-quantity
risk not only through making use of the complementarity of the energy gener-
ation profiles of SH and WP, but also through a multi-market selling strategy.
The numerical example shows that such a strategy can add considerable economic
value to the holding’s business. In fact, it is shown that, when compared with the
best-performing single-market selling strategies such as the ones considered in pre-
viously published studies, applying the proposed multi-market strategy results in
3.60%, 6.46%, and 3.37% higher optimal values for the three risk aversion param-
eters 0.1, 0.5, and 0.9, respectively. When compared with the worst-performing
single-market strategy, on the other hand, the proposed multi-market strategy
achieved even higher increases of 46.51%, 45.31%, and 76.94%, respectively. It is
important to note that our proposed multi-market commercialisation strategy will
always be at least as good as any single-market strategy.
We also investigated the sensitivity of the optimal portfolio composition subject
to an alteration of the investor’s attitude towards risk. Through altering the risk
aversion parameter used within the measure of value we found that acting in a more
risk-averse way almost always results in smaller portfolios and in comparatively
less energy sold via long-term contracts in both the RCE and FCE, while the
spot market becomes increasingly important for exploiting hedging opportunities.
This new portfolio-based approach is relevant to a risk-aware holding company
wishing to build an optimal investment portfolio that potentially consists of all
three important renewable energy sources and uses financial instruments (long-
term forward contracts and call options) in the FCE and RCE contract markets,
as well as balancing sales and purchases in the the spot market.
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Appendix A. Time sets for numerical example
Considering the structure presented by Figure 1 and using the notation of
Subsection Appendix C results in the sets shown by Table A.4.
Set Element(s) of set
T {1, 2, . . . , 311, 312}
T I {1, 2, . . . , 35, 36}
T II {37, 38, . . . , 59, 60}
T III {61, 62, . . . , 299, 300}
T IV {301, 302, . . . , 311, 312}
T A {1, 2, . . . , 25, 26}
T I,A {1, 2, 3}
T II,A {4, 5}
T III,A {6, 7, . . . , 24, 25}
T IV,A {26}
T Q {1, 2, 3, 4}
Table A.4: Elements for the sets corresponding with the structure of Figure 1.
Then, by applying the functions we get for example:
y(75) = 7, mA(7) = {73, 74, . . . , 83, 84},
mA(7) = 73, mA(7) = 84, q(7) = 2,
and
y(299) = 25, mA(25) = {289, 290, . . . , 299, 300},
mA(25) = 289, mA(25) = 300, q(25) = 4.
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Appendix B. Deterministic cash flow component
The investment costs are calculated on an annual basis and we model this by
assuming they are due on the first month of the corresponding year, i.e. the month
where t = mA(y(t)). The structure for external financing is based on the “Project
Finance” programme of the Brazilian development bank BNDES. The investment
cash flow I invj,t in plant j in month t was adapted from [35] and is given by:
I invj,t =

I0j · eRj if (y(t) = 1) and t = mA(y(t))
I0j · (1− eRj ) ·
[(
1− y(t)−2
LTj
)
· ij + 1LTj
]
if (2 ≤ y(t) ≤ LTj + 1) and t = mA(y(t))
0 otherwise.
(B.1)
Combining the investment cost cash flow with the monthly fixed costs for op-
eration and maintenance, cFj of plant j, the deterministic component Ct in month
t is given by:
Ct =

∑
j∈P
I invj,t · Fj if t ∈ T I∑
j∈P
[
I invj,t + c
F
j
]
· Fj if t ∈ T II ∪ T III
0 otherwise.
(B.2)
Appendix C. Modelling of contracts in the RCE
• RCE contracts formulated according to most recent “A-5” new energy auc-
tion in December 2012 [30].
• SH use a forward “quantity” contract.
• BIO & WP use “availability” contracts.
• For the stochastic cash flow of SH:
RRCEj,t,s =
[(
pRCEj −piPj,t,s
) ·QRCEj +piPj,t,s ·gj,t,s ·FRCEj ] ·ht, ∀j ∈ PSH, t ∈ T III , s ∈ S
(C.1)
• For the deterministic cash flow of BIO:
RRCEj,t,s = p
RCE
j · ht · FRCEj , ∀j ∈ PBIO, t ∈ T III , s ∈ S (C.2)
• For the stochastic cash flow of WP, for all j ∈ PWP, s ∈ S:
23
RRCEj,t,s =
F
RCE
j ·
(
pRCEj · ht +RSPOTj,t,s −RIAj,t,s −RIQj,t,s
)
if t ∈ T III
FRCEj ·
(
−RIAj,t,s −RIQj,t,s
)
if t ∈ T IV ,
(C.3)
where the terms in brackets are parameters and defined as follows.
RSPOTj,t,s =

QSPOTj,y(t),s ·
mA(y(t))∑
k=mA(y(t))
piPj,k,s
|mA(y(t))| if t ∈ {m
A(b)}b∈T III
0 otherwise,
(C.4)
is the revenue from the spot market for plant j in month t and scenario s.
QSPOTj,y(t),s = max
{
mA(y(t))∑
k=mA(y(t))
[(
BINIj,y(t),s + gj,k,s − δq(y(t))
)
· hk
]
, 0
}
, (C.5)
is the amount sold in the spot market by plant j in year y(t) and scenario s.
BINIj,y(t),s =

BACC
j,y(t)−1,mA(y(t)−1),s − 1 if
mA(y(t)−1)∑
k=mA(y(t)−1)
gj,k,s ≥ 90%
BINIj,y(t)−1,s − 0.1 if
mA(y(t)−1)∑
k=mA(y(t)−1)
gj,k,s < 90%
0 if q(y(t)) = 1,
(C.6)
is the “initial” balance of plant j in year y(t) and scenario s.
BACCj,y(t),t,s = min
{
BINIj,y(t),s +
∑t
k=mA(y(t)) gj,k,s · hk∑mA(y(t))
l=mA(y(t))
hl
, δq(y(t))
}
, (C.7)
is the “accumulated” balance of plant j in month t of year y(t) and scenario s.
δq(y(t)) =

1.3 if q(y(t)) = 1
1.2 if q(y(t)) = 2
1.1 if q(y(t)) = 3
1.0 if q(y(t)) = 4,
(C.8)
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is the value of the piecewise linear function at the position q of year y(t).
RIAj,t,s =
{
1
12
·RIAAj,t,s if y(t) ∈ T III,A ∪ T IV,A \ {min T III,A}
0 otherwise,
(C.9)
is the annual contractual penalty of plant j in month t and scenario s.
RIAAj,t,s = max
{
0,
mA(y(t)−1)∑
k=mA(y(t)−1)
[(
0.9−BINIj,y(t)−1,s − gj,k,s
)
· hk
]}
·max
{
pRCEj ,
mA(y(t)−1)∑
k=mA(y(t)−1)
piPj,k,s
|mA(y(t)− 1)|
}
,
(C.10)
is the total monetary value of the annual contractual penalty of plant j in month
t and scenario s.
RIQj,t,s =
{
1
12
·RIQQj,t,s if
(
q(y(t)− 1) = 4) and (y(t) 6= min T III,A)
0 otherwise,
(C.11)
is the quadrennial contractual penalty of plant j in month t and scenario s.
RI
QQ
j,t,s = max
{
0,
mA(y(t)−1)∑
k=mA(y(t)−4)
hk −max
{
0.9 ·
mA(y(t)−1)∑
l=mA(y(t)−4)
hl,
mA(y(t)−1)∑
z=mA(y(t)−4)
gj,z,s · hz
}}
·max
{
pRCEj ,
mA(y(t)−1)∑
k=mA(y(t)−4)
piPj,k,s∣∣∣⋃4ξ=1mA(y(t)− ξ)∣∣∣
}
,
(C.12)
is the total monetary value of the quadrennial contractual penalty of plant j in
month t and scenario s.
Nomenclature
The life of a holding company is subdivided into major sections as in Figure 1:
Major section I is the construction period, II is the period with contracts in the
FCE only, III is the period with contracts in both the FCE and the RCE, and IV
is the short period following commercialisation due to contractual obligations.
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Sets
P Set of power plants. Sets of power plants of the type SH, WP, and BIO
are denoted by PSH, PWP, and PBIO, respectively, forming subsets of P .
T Set of months within the project. T is partitioned into T I , T II , T III ,
and T IV , which are the sets of months in each of the major sections.
T A Set of years in the project. T A is partitioned into T I,A, T II,A, T III,A,
and T IV,A, which are the sets of years in each of the major sections.
T Q Index of year within quadrennial period, i.e. {1,2,3,4}.
CFCE Set of contracts in the FCE.
S Set of scenarios.
Parameters
Fmaxj Certificate of plant j with an installed capacity of 30 MW, in avgMW
I0j Investment costs of plant j, in R$/avgMW
cFj Operation and maintenance costs per month of plant j, R$/avgMW
eRj Equity ratio of the investment project corresponding to plant j
LTj Credit period of external financing of the investment project correspond-
ing to plant j
ij Interest rate on debt for the investment project corresponding to plant j
ht Number of hours in month t
KA Annual discount rate
K Monthly discount rate
α Probability level, α ∈ (0, 1)
λ Risk aversion parameter, λ ∈ [0, 1]
pFCE,Si Energy price of contract i in the FCE during major section S, in R$/MWh
pRCEj Energy price of contract j in the RCE, in R$/MWh
piCi,t,s Electricity spot price in the submarket where contract i is closed in month
t and in scenario s, in R$/MWh
piPj,t,s Electricity spot price in the submarket where plant j is located in month
t and in scenario s, in R$/MWh
gj,t,s Ratio of energy generated by plant j in month t in scenario s to long-term
average annual generation of that plant
Variables
Fj Share of the certificate which is available to plant j, in avgMW
FRCEj Share of the certificate which is available to plant j that is allocated to
contracts in the RCE, in avgMW
QFCE,Si Energy sold by the Portfolio Manager via forward contract i in the FCE
during major section S, in avgMW
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QRCEj Energy sold by plant j via forward contract in the RCE, in avgMW
za CVaRα auxiliary variable for year a
δa,s CVaRα auxiliary variable for year a and scenario s
In addition to time-related information, we require functions that enable map-
ping from one set to another, thus allowing a switch between time bases, such as
from months to corresponding years. Therefore, the functions used are:
• y : T → T A y(t) is the year containing month t.
• mA : T A → T mA(a) is the set of months in year a.
• q : T III,A → T Q q(a) is the position in the quadrennial period of year a.
• F/F : The limits of a set of numbers F are denoted by F = maxF and
F = minF .
Appendix A contains some numerical examples to clarify the definitions of sets
and mappings presented above.
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